7/30. Representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) held ex parte meetings in July with Federal Communications Commission (FCC) officials to lobby for rules that would have the effect of expanding the scope of the CALEA statute to broadband internet services offered by cable and wireline providers.

See especially, July 11, 2003 notice of ex parte communication [15 pages in PDF] submitted to the FCC by Leslie Szwajkowski, a Unit Chief in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Electronic Surveillance Technology Section (ESTS), regarding a July 10 ex parte meeting. The DOJ and FBI argue that "broadband networks may ultimately replace narrowband networks. This trend offers increasing opportunities for terrorists, spies, and criminals to evade lawful electronic surveillance."

The CALEA statute gives the FCC authority to promulgate implementing regulations. The FCC has a proceeding for this purpose, numbered CC Docket No. 97-213. The FCC has promulgated CALEA rules. However, the DOJ and FBI are seeking these rules, not through a CALEA rule making, but as part of the FCC's proceedings regarding the regulatory classification of broadband services.

The regulatory classification of broadband internet services is important for many reasons. Different regulatory regimes applied to different regulatory categories. For example, services that fall within the regulatory classification of "information services" are largely unregulated. In contrast, services that fall within the regulatory category of "telecommunications services" are heavily regulated. They are subject to universal service contributions, consumer privacy rules, interconnection requirements, unbundling requirements, resale obligations, and other mandates. Certain telecommunications services, but not information services, are also subject to the CALEA.

The FCC has already stated that "we conclude that cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that there is no separate offering of telecommunications service". It has also stated that "we tentatively conclude that when an entity provides wireline broadband Internet access service over its own transmission facilities, this service, too, is an information service under the Act. In addition, we tentatively conclude that the transmission component of retail wireline broadband Internet access service provided over an entity’s own facilities is ``telecommunications´´ and not a ``telecommunications service.´´". However, the FCC has several open NPRMs pertaining to these regulatory classification issues.

Companies that provide DSL service over wireline facilities seek classification as an information service, or as they put it, "regulatory parity" with cable modem service providers. See, TLJ story titled "House Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Classification of Broadband Services", July 21, 2003

CALEA. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) is codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010. Congress passed the CALEA in 1994 for the purpose of allowing law enforcement authorities to maintain their existing wiretap capabilities in new telecommunications devices. It enumerated that wireline, cellular, and broadband Personal Communications Services carriers must make their equipment capable of certain surveillance functions.

Section 103 (47 U.S.C. § 1002) provides, in part, that "a telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable of expeditiously isolating and enabling the government ... intercept, to the exclusion of any other communications, all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier within a service area to or from equipment, facilities, or services of a subscriber of such carrier concurrently with their transmission to or from the subscriber's equipment, facility, or service, or at such later time as may be acceptable to the government".

The Act also requires telecommunications carriers to ensure that its facilities are capable of enabling the government "to access call-identifying information".

However, the CALEA also provides that its provisions do not apply to "information services". Subsection 103(b) provides that "The requirements of subsection (a) of this section do not apply to -- (A) information services ..."

Subsection 102(6) (47 U.S.C. § 1001) provides that "The term ``information services'' --
  (A) means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications; and
  (B) includes -- (i) a service that permits a customer to retrieve stored information from, or file information for storage in, information storage facilities; (ii) electronic publishing; and (iii) electronic messaging services; but
  (C) does not include any capability for a telecommunications carrier's internal management, control, or operation of its telecommunications network."

Subsection 102(8) provides that "The term ``telecommunications carrier'' ... (C) does not include -- (i) persons or entities insofar as they are engaged in providing information services".

The CALEA also provides, in subsection 102(8)(B)(ii) that "telecommunications carrier" includes "a person or entity engaged in providing wire or electronic communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the Commission finds that such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange service and that it is in the public interest to deem such a person or entity to be a telecommunications carrier for purposes of this chapter". The DOJ and FBI's July 11 notice of ex parte communication reveals that the DOJ and FBI rely heavily upon this subsection in their arguments, and largely ignore the provisions that reference "information services".

FBI Request. Representatives of the FBI and DOJ held a series of private meeting with FCC officials to make requests regarding the applications of the CALEA to broadband internet services. That is, they did not make their meeting at a public hearing or event, nor did they submit their requests as written comments in these proceedings. However, the FCC, which allows certain ex parte communications, also has ex parte rules that require disclosure of the nature of those communications. The FBI submitted several letters, and copy of a document titled "DOJ and FBI Ex Parte Presentation in the FCC's Broadband Internet Access Proceedings". It appears to be an outline of an oral presentation, rather than a complete expression of the FBI's position.

The DOJ and FBI argue that "the Commission has not yet ruled that CALEA covers broadband telephony (otherwise known as ``IP telephony,´´ ``Internet telephony,´´ or VoIP´´), there is no safe-harbor CALEA solution for broadband telephony, and broadband telephony involves packet-mode communications, which are more difficult to intercept than circuit-mode communications."

They further state that "The need for CALEA-standardized broadband intercept capabilities is especially urgent in light of today’s heightened threats to homeland security and the ongoing tendency of criminals to use the most clandestine modes of communication."

The DOJ and FBI conclude that "The Commission should rule that CALEA applies to any transmission used by wireline or cable modem Internet access providers for services such as broadband telephony".

Moreover, "The Commission should specifically rule that for purposes of CALEA, wireline and cable modem Internet access providers are ``telecommunications carriers´´ but have no CALEA obligations insofar as they are engaged in providing information services".

The DOJ and FBI document does not address how government interception would obtain only packets that contain "voice", as opposed to other packets.

Classifying broadband internet access services as "telecommunications" would have broad consequences for service providers, and consumers. However, the DOJ and FBI appear to argue for an FCC determination that broadband can be classified as "telecommunications" for the purpose of CALEA, but as "information" for the purposes of interconnection, unbundling, resale, and other things. Their notice of ex parte communications includes the statement that "Broadband services would still be subject to minimal regulation because CALEA coverage would not force the Commission to impose any other regulatory mandates."

FCC's Broadband Classification Proceedings. The DOJ and FBI have approached the FCC to rule within the context, not of its CALEA proceeding, but rather, two of its broadband classification proceedings.

First, there is the Cable Modem Service NPRM. This is Docket No. 00-185 and Docket No. 02-52. It is actually both a Declaratory Ruling (DR) and a NPRM. The FCC adopted a Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [75 pages in PDF] at its March 14, 2002 meeting. See also, March 14 FCC release.

This NPRM addresses the legal classification and the appropriate regulatory framework for broadband access to the Internet over cable system facilities. It states that "we conclude that cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and that there is no separate offering of telecommunications service. In addition, we initiate a rulemaking proceeding to determine the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate cable modem service and whether (and, if so, how) cable modem service should be regulated under the law ..." (Parentheses in original.)

Second, there is the FCC's Wireline Broadband NRPM. This is Docket 02-33, 95-20 and 98-10. The FCC adopted this NPRM [58 pages in PDF] at its February 14, 2002 meeting. See also, the FCC's notice in the Federal Register. This NPRM pertains to the appropriate regulatory framework for broadband access to the Internet over wireline facilities.

This NPRM states that "we examine the appropriate classification for wireline broadband Internet access service. As discussed more fully below, we tentatively conclude that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the provision of wireline broadband Internet access service is an information service. In addition, we tentatively conclude that when an entity provides wireline broadband Internet access service over its own transmission facilities, this service, too, is an information service under the Act. In addition, we tentatively conclude that the transmission component of retail wireline broadband Internet access service provided over an entity’s own facilities is ``telecommunications´´ and not a ``telecommunications service.´´ We seek comment on these tentative conclusions and ask additional questions with regard to the proper classification of wireline broadband Internet access service."

Nevertheless, the FCC did mention the CALEA in one paragraph of this 58 page NPRM. The NPRM states, at paragraph 55, on page 26, that "We ask commenters to discuss how our tentative conclusion that wireline broadband Internet access service is an information service will affect the scope of the CALEA assistance capabilities that telecommunications carriers must offer to law enforcement authorities. Commenters should address what effect, if any, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 may have on an entity that provides information services. While section 222 of the USA PATRIOT Act states that "nothing in this Act shall impose any additional technical obligation or requirement on a provider of wire or electronic communication service or other person to furnish facilities or technical assistance," commenters may wish to discuss how the expansion of surveillance authority to electronic communications under various provision of the USA PATRIOT Act might affect providers of wireline broadband Internet access service if these services were classified as information services. More generally, we ask for comment on how designating wireline broadband Internet access service as an information service may affect other national security or emergency preparedness obligations applicable to service providers and their networks." (Footnotes omitted.)

Section 222 of the PATRIOT Act, which is referenced in the FCC's NPRM, was originally offered as an amendment to the bill during the House Judiciary Committee's markup on the night of October 3, 2001. The legislative history is noteworthy. It was offered by Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA) and cosponsored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and Rep. Chris Cannon (R-UT), three of the leading technophiles in the House. Rep. Boucher and Rep. Goodlatte are co-chairs of the Internet Caucus. Rep. Goodlatte and Rep. Boucher both explained their reasons for offering this amendment, during the markup, and outside the hearing room. They were concerned about the history of the implementation of the CALEA. They explained that the Congress passed this Act in 1994 to enable law enforcement authorities to maintain their existing wiretap capabilities in new telecommunications devices. The Congress had cell phones in mind, and expressly excluded the internet. The Act provides that wireline, cellular, and broadband PCS carriers must make their equipment capable of certain surveillance functions. However, the FBI has since sought an implementation of CALEA that expands surveillance capabilities beyond those provided in the statute. Moreover, the FCC, which adopted implementing rules, has largely backed the FBI. This has imposed considerable burdens and costs upon service providers, and their customers. This amendment was adopted by unanimous voice vote. Later that night, the Committee approved the bill by a vote of 36-0. See, story titled "No Technology Mandates", and other stories about the markup of the PATRIOT Act, in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 279, October 4, 2001.

The FBI submitted a comment [16 pages in PDF] in the cable broadband proceeding, No. 02-52, on June 17, 2002, in which it argued that the FCC should require in its rules that the CALEA applies to "cable modem service".

The FBI submitted a comment [15 pages in PDF] in the wireline broadband proceeding, Nos. 02-33, 95-20, and 98-10, on April 15, 2002, in which it argued that the FCC should require in its rules that the CALEA applies to "DSL and other forms of wireline broadband Internet access".

More About the Ex Parte Communications. The key document that is a part of the FCC record is the DOJ and FBI's document titled "DOJ and FBI Ex Parte Presentation in the FCC's Broadband Internet Access Proceedings", which is attached to its July 11 notice of ex parte communication.

In addition, the DOJ and FBI submitted a July 15 ex parte communication [PDF] that states that "The Department of Justice (the ``DOJ´´) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the ``FBI´´) hereby submit an addendum to their July 11, 2003 Notice of Ex Parte Presentation in the above-referenced proceedings to add the names of the individuals who represented the above parties at the ex parte presentation.

"Michael Stawasz and Scott McIntosh represented the DOJ. Martin J. King, Ken Coon, Joel M. Margolis, and the undersigned counsel appeared on behalf of the FBI."

This notice also includes a cc list: Carol Mattey, Brent Olson, Thomas J. Beers, Kyle Dixon, Barbara Esbin, Eric Bash, John Kiefer, Alison Greenwald, Priscilla Lee, J. Scott Marcus, Qualex International, Scott McIntosh, and Michael Stawasz.

Also, on July 23, the DOJ and FBI submitted another notice of ex parte communication [PDF] that states describes another ex parte meeting on July 22. It provides this description: "The law enforcement representatives at the meeting were John Pignataro, Deputy Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, Joel M. Margolis, a contract attorney for the FBI's Electronic Surveillance Technology Section (``ESTS´´), Dawn Dohrmann, another ESTS contractor, and the undersigned ESTS Unit Chief. The Commission official in attendance was Daniel Gonzalez, Senior Legal Advisor to Commissioner Kevin J. Martin. The FBI stated that Internet access providers should be deemed telecommunications carriers for purposes of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. In support, the FBI summarized the arguments already placed on the record in its July 11, 2003 Notice of Ex Parte Presentation in the instant proceedings."

All of the DOJ and FBI notices of ex parte communications reference CC Docket Nos. 02-33, 95-20, 98-10 and CS Docket No. 02-52.

Commentary on Process and Transparency. The DOJ and FBI seek a change to the CALEA and surveillance regime that is arguably legislative in nature. That is, it rests heavily on the policy argument that law enforcement authorities will need to be able to monitor voice over IP to be able to catch terrorists and other criminals. This may be a meritorious policy argument. And, while the DOJ and FBI argue that the CALEA statute requires that VOIP be covered, the statute's language defining and exempting information services, combined with the FCC's longstanding treatment of information services, make such a conclusion problematic.

Crafting broad rules based upon a weighing of policy concerns is essentially the legislative function, while drafting detailed rules to implement these legislative mandates is essentially an administrative function. The DOJ and FBI are asking to the FCC to perform the former, rather than the latter, function. However, the present request is not a communication to the Congress requesting a legislative remedy. The legislative process would entail  public hearings, debates, and the input that that would involve. Rather, the DOJ and FBI request an administrative agency to, in effect, legislate through the rule making process.

Second, this administrative agency, the FCC, has a proceeding pertaining to implementing the CALEA statute. It is CC Docket No. 97-213. And, the DOJ and FBI now seek a rule that construes the CALEA. Yet, the present request is not a petition for a rule making in that proceeding. Such a rule making would be governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, which would require public notice, opportunity to submit comments, and an opportunity to review and rebut the comments of others.

Third, the present request has been made in an ex parte manner. That is, representatives of the DOJ and FBI have held closed meetings with FCC representatives. In ex parte communications, there is no notice, no public access, no web cast, and no transcript of the proceedings.

In sum, the DOJ and FBI are pursuing a major change in the law governing the interception of internet communications in a non-transparent manner that evades the procedures and processes normally relied upon to provide the public and affected companies with an opportunity to know about, and participate in, the law making process, and in a manner that deprives the rule makers of the benefit of the further information and arguments that would be advanced in a more transparent process.

7/25. Rep. John Shimkus (R-IL), Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), and others introduced HR 2898, the "E-911 Implementation Act of 2003".

Rep. Eshoo (at right) stated in a release that "In an emergency, when every second counts, most Americans assume they can pick up their cell phone, dial 911, and get immediate help from emergency responders ... But frighteningly, this isn't the case. Today, only 10 percent of our nation's emergency call centers can obtain precise location information from a wireless caller."

HR 2898 is similar to S 1250 the "Enhanced 911 Emergency Communications Act of 2003", sponsored by Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT) and others. On July 17, 2003, the Senate Commerce Committee (SCC) approved its bill by unanimous voice vote, without amendment. See, story titled "Senate Commerce Committee Approves E-911 Bill" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 701, July 18, 2003.

The House bill would require the head of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to create an "E-911 Implementation Coordination Office" to "facilitate coordination and communication between Federal, State, and local emergency communications systems, emergency personnel, public safety organizations, telecommunications carriers, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers and vendors involved in the implementation of E-911 services".

The bill also would authorize the appropriation of $500 Million in grants over five years, to be administered by the NTIA, to enhance emergency communications services. The bill provides that the NTIA "shall require an eligible entity to certify in its application that -- (A) in the case of an eligible entity that is a State government, the entity -- (i) has coordinated its application with the public safety answering points ... located within the jurisdiction of such entity; ...".

The bill would also penalize states for redirecting E-911 funds collected from consumer's cell phone bills. It would require the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to review twice a year fees charged to customers for enhancing 911 services. States would be required to certify that no E911 fees are being used for other purposes. The FCC would be required to notify Congress of states that divert E911 funds. Finally, the NTIA would be required to withhold grant funds to states that are found by the FCC to divert E911 funds.

Steve Berry, SVP of Government Affairs for the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association (CTIA), stated in a release that "Dozens of states have taken a hammer to their E-911 piggy banks and run-off with these vital tax-payer funds, earmarked for public safety ... This legislation creates powerful incentives for states to end the looting and get to work on upgrading their public safety networks."

Finally, the bill would direct the FCC to study E-911 implementation in rural areas.

The bill was referred to the House Commerce Committee. Both Rep. Shimkus and Rep. Eshoo are members.

7/29. The U.S. Court of Appeals (4thCir) issued its opinion [13 pages in PDF] in U.S. v. Jarrett, a case regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) use of a private party to hack computers to obtain evidence of crimes. The District Court had held that the hacker had an agency relationship with the FBI, that there was therefore an unreasonable search by the FBI, and that evidence seized by the government is suppressed. The Appeals Court held there was no agency relationship, and the search by the hacker, though illegal, did not constitute a violation of 4th Amendment rights.

The defendant, William Jarrett, did the crime -- manufacturing child pormography on his PC in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). (He conditionally plead guilty.) And, following the Appeals Court decision, it appears that he will serve time.

The significance of this case, however, is the procedure employed by the FBI to obtain the evidence of his crime, and the precedent that this case sets for FBI agents to use private hackers to obtain information from individuals personal computers by illeg hacking in future cases.

The government obtained its evidence against Jarrett by searching his PC. It was able to conduct this search because it had first obtained a search warrant from a judge. This search warrant was obtained on the representation by the government that an anonymous computer hacker had illegally accessed Jarrett's PC and discovered illegal images. The FBI and court opinions also refer to this hacker as "unknown user" and "Unknownuser", because that was the user name in his e-mail address.

The hacker neither testified in any court proceeding, nor provided sworn testimony. He remained an anonymous e-mail correspondent. He provided no evidence. He provided the basis for obtaining the search warrant. The government's evidence was the fruits of its search of Jarrett's PC. Yet, it would not have obtained this without the hacker's search. Jarrett thus argued that the evidence of the crime should be suppressed because it was obtained as a result an illegal search of his computer by the hacker in violation of his 4th Amendment rights.

The Fourth Amendment provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that the 4th Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by government officials, but not by private parties acting in a private capacity. See, for example, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) and United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.109 (1984).

The hacker searched Jarrett's computer by obtaining unauthorized access to it. He did this by posting a photograph in a pormography newsgroup with a trojan horse program appended. Jarrett downloaded the file, and the appended trojan horse. The hacker was then able to access and search Jarrett's PC via the internet. This is illegal conduct. See, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.

If the hacker had been an FBI Special Agent, it would have been clear that the search by the hacker was illegal, that the subpoena was based upon illegally conduct, that the subpoena was defective, and that the evidence seized in the search conducted pursuant to the subpoena must be suppressed. However, the hacker was not employed by the FBI or other law enforcement authority. He was an anonymous resident of Instanbul, Turkey. The question thus became whether there was an agency relationship between the hacker and the FBI. If there was an agency relationship, then the evidence must be suppressed.

The FBI asserted that there was no agency relationship. However, the District Court found that there was an agency relationship, and suppressed the evidence obtained by the government. The District Court relied upon e-mails exchanged by FBI agents and the hacker.

FBI agents exchanged numerous e-mails with the hacker. He discussed his hacking activities. The FBI thanked him for sending them the fruits of his hacks, and encouraged him to continue, but maintained the pretext that they were not actually asking him to hack into other people's computers.

For example, in one e-mail an FBI agent wrote, "I can not ask you to search out cases such as the ones you have sent to us. That would make you an agent of the Federal Government and make how you obtain your information illegal and we could not use it against the men in the pictures you send. But if you should happen across such pictures as the ones you have sent to us and wish us to look into the matter, please feel free to send them to us. We may have lots of questions and have to email you with the questions. But as long as you are not ‘hacking’ at our request, we can take the pictures and identify the men and take them to court. We also have no desire to charge you with hacking. You are not a US citizen and are not bound by our laws."

An FBI agent wrote in another e-mail, "the FACT still stands that you are not a citizen of the United States and are not bound by our laws. Our Federal attorneys have expressed NO desire to charge you with any CRIMINAL offense."

The FBI statement that "you are not a citizen of the United States and are not bound by our laws" may be contrasted with the actions of the FBI in other cases in which foreign nationals have hacked into computers in the U.S. from abroad. For example, in U.S. v. Aleksey Vladimirovich Ivanov (Eastern District of California), the FBI investigated, and the Department of Justice prosecuted, a Russian who hacked computers from Russia. Of course, the FBI had to trick him into traveling to the U.S. to be able to arrest him. Ivanov plead guilty and was sentenced to 4 years in a U.S. prison. The FBI's statements to the hacker also contrast with the FBI's description of his activities in its application for a search warrant -- "illegally hacking".

The District Court concluded in an order that "the defendant has established that the government knew of and acquiesced in the searches conducted by Unknownuser and that Unknownuser's actions were motivated solely by an interest to further law enforcement efforts. Therefore, the Court concludes that the evidenced seized from the defendant's computer by Unknownuser was the result of an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, thus making the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant defective, as well as the search warrant itself and all evidence seized as a result of its execution. The defendant's motion to suppress is granted, and the evidence will be suppressed."

The government appealed. The Appeals Court was not swayed by the long train of e-mails between the hacker and FBI agents. However, the Appeals Court's conclusion rested on the fact that some of the most damaging e-mails were dated after the hacker had accessed Jarrett's computer. It reasoned that the agency relationship had to exist at the time of the unauthorized access.

The Appeals Court wrote that "Although the Government operated close to the line in this case, it did not (at least on the evidence before the district court) demonstrate the requisite level of knowledge and acquiescence sufficient to make Unknownuser a Government agent when he hacked into Jarrett’s computer." (Parentheses in original.)

This is U.S. v. William Jarrett, No. 02-4953, an appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond, Judge Richard Williams presiding, D.C. No. CR-02-11.

9:30 AM. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold a hearing on pending nominations. The agenda includes the nomination of former Rep. Connie Morella (R-MD) to be the U.S. representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). See, notice. Location: Room 419, Dirksen Building.

10:00 AM. The Senate Finance Committee will meet to consider several pending nominations, including James Jochum (to be Assistant Secretary, Department of Commerce) and Josette Shiner (to be a Deputy U.S. Trade Representative). Location: Room 215, Dirksen Building.

12:15 PM. The Federal Communications Bar Association's (FCBA) Young Lawyers Committee will host a brown bag lunch. The topic will be Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP). The speakers will include Thomas Navin (Deputy Division Chief of the Competition Policy Division of the Wireline Competition Bureau of the FCC). For more information, contact Patrick Sullivan at psullivan@willkie.com or 202 303-1164, or Ryan Wallach at rwallach@willkie.com or 202 303-1159. Location: Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 1875 K Street, NW, Second Floor.

9:30 AM. The Senate Commerce Committee will hold a business meeting. The agenda includes consideration of S 150, the "Internet Tax Non-discrimination Act of 2003", and S 1478, the "National Telecommunications and Information Administration Reauthorization Act of 2003". See, notice. Press contact: Rebecca Hanks (McCain) 202 224-2670 or Andy Davis (Hollings) at 202 224-6654. Location: Room 253, Russell Building.

? 9:30 AM. The Senate Judiciary Committee might hold an executive business meeting. Press contact: Margarita Tapia (Hatch) at 202 224-5225 or David Carle (Leahy) at 202 224-4242. This Committee frequently changes the time and agenda of its meetings without notice. Location: Room 226, Dirksen Building.

10:00 AM. The President's Export Council subcommittee on Export Administration (PECSEA) will hold a meeting. See, notice in the Federal Register: July 15, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 135, at Page 41782. Location: Room 3884, Department of Commerce, 14th Street between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues, NW.

Deadline to submit applications for loans or combination loans and grants to the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) under its FY2003 Distance Learning and Telemedicine Program. See, notice in Federal Register, March 3, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 41, at Page 9973.

2:30 PM. The Senate Commerce Committee's Communications Subcommittee will hold a hearing on the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The witnesses will be Nancy Victory (National Telecommunications and Information Administration), Paul Twomey (P/CEO of ICANN), Ari Balough (SVP of VeriSign), Alan Davidson (Center for Democracy and Technology), and Paul Stahura (CEO of eNom). Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT) will preside. See, notice. Press contact: Rebecca Hanks (McCain) 202 224-2670 or Andy Davis (Hollings) at 202 224-6654. Location: Room 253, Russell Building.

The Senate is scheduled to begin its August recess.

10:00 AM - 12:00 NOON. The Department of State's (DOS) International Telecommunication Advisory Committee (ITAC) will meet to prepare for the meeting of the International Telecommunications Union's ITU-D, Study Groups 1 and 2, in Geneva, Switzerland on September 2-11, 2003. See, notice in Federal Register, July 22, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 140, at Page 43413. Location: DOS, Room 2533-A.

9:30 AM. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) will hold a meeting. Location: FCC, 445 12th Street, SW, Room TW-C05 (Commission Meeting Room).

Deadline to submit comments to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in response to its Notice of Inquiry [21 pages in PDF] in its proceeding titled "In the Matter of Inquiry Regarding Carrier Current Systems, including Broadband over Power Line Systems". See, notice in the Federal Register, May 23, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 100, at Pages 28182 - 28186. See also, story titled "FCC Announces NOI Regarding Broadband Over Powerlines" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 628, April 24, 2003, and story titled "FCC Releases NOI on Broadband Over Power Lines" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 656, May 7, 2003.This is ET Docket No. 03-104. For more information, contact Anh Wride at 202 418-0577 or anh.wride@fcc.gov.

POSTPONED. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) will hold an auction of Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) Service Licenses. This is Auction No. 52. See, notice of postponement in Federal Register, June 20, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 119, at Page 36989.

7/29. The Department of Commerce's (DOC) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which is still also known as the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA), published a notice in the Federal Register stating that it is recruiting members for its six Technical Advisory Committees (TACs). The membership of each TAC is appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, serves about four years, and meets about four times per year. Three TACs are technology related -- Category 3 (electronics and semiconductors), Category 4 (computers), and Category 5 (telecommunications and
information security). The notice states that resumes should be sent to Lee Ann Carpenter at Lcarpent@bis.doc.gov. The deadline is "one year from its date of publication in the Federal Register". See, Federal Register, July 29, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 145, at Page 44524.

7/29. President Bush signed an executive order pertaining to homeland security information sharing.

7/24. The American Antitrust Institute filed an amicus curiae brief [38 pages in PDF] with the Supreme Court in Verizon Communications v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, urging that the Court of Appeals be affirmed. See, TLJ story titled "Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Verizon v. Trinko", March 10, 2003.

7/29 The Consumers Union wrote another letter expressing its opposition to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) new media ownership rules, announced on June 2, 2003. This letter encourages Senators to cosponsor legislation. Meanwhile, on July 28, FCC Chairman Michael Powell again expressed his support for the FCC's Report and Order. See, opinion piece [PDF] titled "New Rules, Old Rhetoric", published in the FCC web site, and in the New York Times. See, June 2 Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [257 pages in PDF] amending media ownership rules. See also, story titled "FCC Announces Revisions to Media Ownership Rules" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 672, June 3, 2003.

7/28. John Orlando was named EVP, Government Relations, at the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB). He has worked for the NAB since January of 2001. Previously, he worked at Timmons & Co., a lobbying firm. From 1989 through 1993, Orlando was chief of staff for the House Commerce Committee. See, NAB release.

7/28. The Senate confirmed Earl Leroy Yeakel and Kathleen Cardone to be a Judges of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.