House Crime Subcommittee
Begins Oversight Hearings On PATRIOT Act |
4/26. The House Judiciary Committee's
(HJC) Subcommittee on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Security held oversight hearings on
Thursday, April 21, Tuesday, April 26, and twice on Thursday, April 28. It will
hold more hearings on Tuesday, May 3, and Thursday, May 5.
This article, and related articles in this issue, cover those portions of
these hearings that pertained to electronic surveillance and new
technologies. The HJC is taking a methodical section by section approach, seeking
government public input, and government explanations of how it is implementing
each section. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is cooperating to the extent that
it is sending witnesses. However, government witnesses have been evasive or
non-responsive on many issues raised by members of the Subcommittee.
Government witnesses are using
the hearing to advocate permanent extension of the sunsetting provisions of the
PATRIOT Act. They are also highlighting the threats of terrorism, and the
dedication of government personnel fighting terrorism.
To bolster their case for extension of § 215 (which may it easier for the FBI
to acquire business records, including library records) and of all sunsetting
sections of the PATRIOT Act, the government disclosed for the first time at a
hearing on April 28 that 9/11 hijackers had used library computers in the U.S.
Rep. Howard
Coble (R-NC) (at right), the Chairman of the Crime Subcommittee, wrote in his
opening statement on April 21 that "Our Nation has a dependency problem -- one
that we need to nurture and protect. That dependency is on technology. Computers and
related technology have improved every aspect of our lives -- our health care, our
education, and our security, just to name a few. This same technology also aids
those who threaten our Nation, as it facilitates terrorists and criminals alike.
At the stroke of a key, someone can cause millions of dollars of damage to our
economy or shut down the 9-1-1 systems of our emergency responders. The threat
has grown with the benefits of and dependency on technology."
Several Republican members of the Subcommittee, especially Rep. Dan Lungren
(R-CA), are defending the DOJ and the PATRIOT Act. Several Democrats are
criticizing the PATRIOT Act.
Rep. William Delahunt (D-MA)
stated on April 21 that the two issues are "privacy" and "transparency".
"People like myself really don't know what is happening", said the former state
prosecutor. But, there is a "profound unease that something is happening". He
added that "if you don't have the right to privacy that is the beginning of
totalitarianism".
On April 28 he stated that these hearings would not be taking place if there
were no sunset clause. Hence, he argued that when the Congress passes legislation to address
the present sunset clause, it should enact a further sunset provision. He argued that this
sunsetting gives the Congress "leverage" to conduct oversight of how the DOJ is
implementing the PATRIOT Act.
The government surveillance system, said Rep. Delahunt, "needs more than just
checks and balances with the executive branch". It needs effective Congressional
oversight. Hence, he suggested sunsetting the entire PATRIOT Act.
Rep. Jeff Flake (R-AZ), who is
turning out to be the Republican member of the Subcommittee who is the most
skeptical of the PATRIOT Act, and the DOJ's implementation of it, stated at a
news conference on April 28 that the Congress should have sunsetted the entire
PATRIOT Act in 2001.
History of the USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym for
"Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001". The 107th Congress enacted this bill
quickly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It was
HR 3162.
It became Public Law 107-56 on October 26, 2001.
The bill was approved by the House on October 24, 2001 by a vote of 357-66. See,
Roll Call No. 398.
Three Republicans and sixty-two Democrats voted against the bill.
Much of Title II of the PATRIOT Act pertains to electronic surveillance
affecting new technologies. § 224 of the PATRIOT Act provides that many of the
provisions of Title II sunset at the end of 2005, unless extended. These hearings address
the sunsetting provisions. However, there are also many proposals to modify or repeal other
sections of the PATRIOT Act that are not scheduled to sunset.
See, table in this issue titled "Summary of Title II of the
PATRIOT Act".
The HJC committee is proceeding methodically, taking a few provisions at a time.
Government witnesses are testifying at each hearing, along with a smaller number
of critical witnesses.
Schedule of Hearings. The full Committee held a hearing on April 6, 2005. See, story titled "House
Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on PATRIOT Act" in TLJ Daily
E-Mail Alert No. 1,112, April 11, 2005.
The Crime Subcommittee held its first hearing on April 21. That hearing addressed three sections of
the PATRIOT Act that are scheduled to sunset:
- § 209, titled "Seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants".
- § 217, titled "Interception of computer trespasser communications".
- § 220, titled "Nationwide service of search warrants for electronic
evidence".
The Subcommittee heard testimony from, and questioned, four witnesses on
April 21.
The April 26 hearing addressed five sections that are scheduled to sunset:
- § 204, titled "Clarification of Intelligence Exceptions
from Limitations on Interception & Disclosure of Wire, Oral & Electronic
Communications".
- § 207, titled "Duration of FISA Surveillance of
Non-United States persons who are Agents of a Foreign Power".
- § 214, titled "Pen Register and Trap and Trace Authority
Under FISA".
- § 225, titled "Immunity for Compliance with FISA Wiretap".
- § 6001 and 6002 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
regarding lone wolf terrorists.
- The agenda did not include § 216, titled "Modification of authorities
relating to use of pen register and trap and trace devices". However, it was
discussed also. It is not scheduled to sunset.
The Subcommittee heard testimony from, and questioned, three witnesses on
April 26:
The Thursday,
April 28, 9:30 AM hearing addressed two sections:
- § 206,
titled "Roving Surveillance Authority Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978".
- § 215, titled "Access to Records and Other Items Under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act".
- The agenda did not include the use of national security letters or § 505. However,
these were discussed.
The Subcommittee heard testimony from, and questioned, three witnesses at the
9:30 AM hearing on April 26.
- Kenneth Wainstain, interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.
- James Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy at the DOJ.
- Robert Khuzami, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York.
- Gregory Nojeim (ACLU).
The Thursday,
April 28, 2:30 PM hearing addressed one section:
- § 218, titled "Foreign Intelligence Information".
The Subcommittee heard testimony from, and questioned, four witnesses at the
9:30 AM hearing on April 26.
The
Subcommittee will hold a hearing on Tuesday, May 3. This hearing will address:
- § 201, titled
"Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications relating
to terrorism".
- § 202, titled
"Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications relating
to computer fraud and abuse offenses".
- § 223, titled
"Civil liability for certain unauthorized disclosures".
- § 213, titled
"Authority for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant" (which is
also known as sneak and peak).
The Subcommittee will hold a hearing on Thursday, May 5. This hearing will address:
- § 212, titled "Emergency disclosure of electronic communications to protect life and
limb".
Members of the Crime Subcommittee. The Crime Subcommittee has 16 members,
10 Republicans and 6 Democrats.
Rep. Dan Lungren (R-CA) has taken on
the roll of actively defending the DOJ and PATRIOT Act. To a certain degree,
Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH),
Rep. Mike Pence (R-IN), and
Rep. Louie Gohmert (R-TX) have done the same.
Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC) and
Rep. Jeff Flake
(R-AZ) are engaging in diligent oversight, asking detailed questions that seek
information relevant to concerns that have been raised by Members of Congress, legal
scholars, interest groups, reporters and constituents. In addition, Rep. Coble,
the Chairman of the Subcommittee, is allowing both critics and defenders of the
PATRIOT Act latitude to pursue their lines of questioning, by allowing extensions of
time, and second rounds of questioning.
Outside of the
hearing room, Rep. Flake (at right) is also expressing criticism of the PATRIOT Act.
For example, on April 28 a new caucus named the "Patriot Act Reform Caucus" held
a news conference to announce its formation. Rep. Flake is one of the chairs of
the caucus. The other participants in the news conference were
Rep. Butch Otter (R-ID),
Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX),
Rep. Bernie Sanders (I-VT), and
Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY). Only Rep.
Flake is a member of the Crime Subcommittee. Although, Rep. Nadler is a member
of the full Committee.
Rep. Bobby Scott (D-VA), the ranking
Democrat on the Subcommittee, Rep. John Conyers
(D-MI), the ranking Democrat on the full Committee, and
Rep. William Delahunt (D-MA) are asking tough
questions, and expressing criticisms of parts of the PATRIOT Act. Rep. Scott has
been constantly present throughout the hearings. Rep. Delahunt has been present
throughout most of the hearings.
Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA) and
Rep. Sheila Lee (D-TX) have been making
brief appearances at the hearings to offer pointed criticisms of the PATRIOT Act and the
DOJ.
Rep. Mark Green (R-WI),
Rep. Ric Keller (R-FL),
Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA), and
Rep. Tom Feeney (R-FL) have each played little
or no role in the Subcommittee hearings so far.
Rep. Anthony Weiner (D-NY) is not
participating. He voted for the PATRIOT Act in 2001. Although, he offered harsh words
about the DOJ when Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales testified on April 6, 2005. Rep.
Marty Meehan (D-MA) is not participating either. He voted for the PA in 2001.
The full Committee membership has 23 Republicans and 17 Democrats. Of the
current members, only six voted against the PATRIOT Act in 2001:
Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA),
Rep. Conyers, Rep. Lee, Rep. Nadler, Rep. Scott, Rep. Waters, and
Rep. Mel Watt (D-NC). All are
Democrats.
The House vote on October 24, 2001 was 357-66. See,
Roll Call No. 398. Only
three of the 66 no votes were cast by Republicans: Rep.
Bob Ney (R-OH), Rep. Otter, and Rep. Paul. None are on the HJC.
Related stories published this month:
- "House Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on PATRIOT Act" in TLJ
Daily E-Mail Alert No. 1,112, April 11, 2005.
- "Senate
Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on PATRIOT Act" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert
No. 1,110, April 6, 2005.
- "Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing Touches on Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device Authority" in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 1,110, April 6, 2005.
Related Stories in This Issue.
- "House Crime Subcommittee Holds Hearing on
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device Authority"
- "House Crime Subcommittee Holds Hearing on § 209 of PATRIOT Act, Stored
Communications and VOIP"
- "House Crime Subcommittee Holds Hearing on § 217 of PATRIOT Act"
- "House Crime Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Library and ISP Records and §
215 of the Patriot Act and National Security Letters"
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House Crime Subcommittee Holds Hearing on
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device Authority |
4/26. The House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Security held oversight hearings
on Thursday, April 26. It addressed among other topics, §§ 214 and 216 of the
PATRIOT Act, which pertain to internet surveillance.
The agenda for the hearing included oversight of the
Department of Justice's (DOJ) implementation
of § 214, titled "Pen Register and Trap and Trace Authority Under FISA".
This section is scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2005.
The agenda did not include § 216, titled "Modification of authorities
relating to use of pen register and trap and trace devices". This section is not
scheduled to sunset. However, Subcommittee members' questions addressed pen register and
trap and trace device (PRTTD) authority generally, and not just § 214.
Rep. Bobby Scott (D-VA), the
ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee, questioned the witnesses about what
information could be collected with a PRTTD order in the context of e-mail and
use of the web. The government witnesses, Mary Beth Buchanan and James Baker,
were evasive and non-responsive.
Buchanan is the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania. See,
prepared testimony
[PDF]. Baker is Counsel for Intelligence Policy at the DOJ. He is a member of the Senior
Executive Service. See,
prepared testimony [PDF].
Background on PRTTDs. The government obtains different types of orders
for different types of surveillance. There are widely different standards for obtaining
different types of orders. For example, there are wiretap orders, PRTTD orders, and
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) orders. A wiretap order, which enables law
enforcement agencies to obtain the content of a phone call or e-mail, is issued by a judge
upon a showing of probable cause. There are also other requirements. This is often referred
to as a Title III order. This is a very high standard.
There is a much lower standard for law enforcement agencies to obtain a PRTTD
order. Before passage of the PATRIOT Act, the sections of the criminal code pertaining to
PRTTD orders merely authorized the government to obtain outgoing and incoming phone numbers.
§ 216 of the PATRIOT Act added the words "routing, addressing", thereby
enabling PRTTD orders to include e-mail and web addressing and routing information. However,
the PATRIOT did not elaborate on the distinction between routing and addressing information
and the content of e-mail and web communications.
Under § 216, the court must issue a PRTTD order if the government certifies mere
relevance to a criminal investigation. The judge has no discretion. The Supreme Court has
upheld this procedure on the basis that only phone numbers are obtained.
Finally, there is a separate, and low, standard for FISA orders. Under the
PATRIOT Act, a significant purpose of the surveillance must be foreign
intelligence gathering.
The statutes for wiretaps and PRTTD orders were drafted with analog Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) voice service in mind. Originally,
18
U.S.C. § 3127 provided that a pen register records the numbers that are dialed or punched
into a telephone, while a trap and trace device captures the incoming electronic
or other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or
device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted. The
PATRIOT Act expanded the scope of surveillance under pen register and trap and
trace authority to include internet routing and addressing information. That is,
an e-mail address in the "To:" line of an e-mail message is somewhat analogous
to the number dialed in a PSTN voice call.
Witness
Testimony. Buchanan (at right) wrote in her
prepared
testimony [6 pages in PDF] that that the PATRIOT Act made the requirements
for obtaining a PRTTD order in intelligence investigations similar to the
requirements in criminal investigations. "Section 214 of the USA PATRIOT Act allows
the government to obtain a pen register order in national security
investigations where the information likely is relevant to an international
terrorism or espionage investigation. This provision is similar to the 1986
criminal pen register statute (18 U.S.C. § 3121) that has been frequently used
by criminal prosecutors to obtain pen registers and trap and trace devices in a
variety of criminal investigations." She added that "Pen registers are not used
to collect the content of communications." She did not specifically address
§ 216.
She continued that "Currently under FISA, government officials similarly
may seek a court order for a pen register or trap-and-trace device to gather foreign
intelligence information or information about international terrorism or espionage.
Prior to enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, FISA required government personnel
to certify not just that the information they sought was relevant to an intelligence
investigation, but also that the facilities to be monitored had been used or were about to be
used to contact a foreign agent or an agent of a foreign power, such as a terrorist or
spy. Thus, it was much more difficult to obtain an effective pen register or trap-and-trace
order in an international terrorism investigation than in a criminal investigation."
She added that "Section 214 of the USA PATRIOT Act brought
authorities for terrorism and other foreign intelligence investigations more
into line with similar criminal authorities by permitting court approval of FISA
pen registers and trap-and-trace orders even though an applicant might be unable
to certify at that stage of an investigation that the facilities themselves,
such as phones, are used by foreign agents or those engaged in international
terrorist or clandestine intelligence activities."
Rep.
Scott (at right) pursued a line of questions regarding the distinction between content and
addressing and routing information. This was a question that was asked during
consideration of the PATRIOT Act in 2001, but never fully answered. Rep. Scott
did not receive responsive answers at this hearing.
Buchanan said that the information available is the numbers "being dialed
from the telephone". She added that "this is not content information", and
that its purpose is "to show connections between individuals".
In response to further questions from Rep. Scott regarding the internet, she
asserted that "it is really no different" on the internet. She asserted that
"content information is not collected".
Scott persisted by asking several times what information does the government
get. Buchanan said "just routing information", but, "there could be inadvertent
collection".
In response to a specific question about e-mail subject lines, she said, "No
subject line."
Rep. Scott then asked "do you get to know what web site was looked at?"
Buchanan then deferred to James Baker. Baker did not provide a responsive
answer. He discussed technology, and evaded the inquiry.
Rep. Scott stated that "what web sites you look at has content implications",
citing health and book sale web sites. Baker neither confirmed nor disputed this
statement.
Rep. Scott asked if the government could use a PRTTD order to obtain "what
books I bought off of Amazon.com". Baker did not provide an answer. He did,
however, state that business records are not protected under the 4th Amendment,
and that business records in the nature of book purchase records are not
protected under the 4th Amendment.
TLJ asked Baker after the hearing whether the government has authority under
a PRTTD order to obtain the URL of an Amazon.com book order page. He stated
again that the 4th Amendment does not apply to business records, including book
sales records. He also stated that he will not disclose whether or not the government
has used a PRTTD order to obtain the URLs of Amazon.com book order pages. He also
stated that he will not disclose whether or not it is the opinion of the DOJ
that it has the authority to obtain the URL of an Amazon.com book order page
with a PRTTD order.
Neither Baker nor Buchanan stated why they will not answer such basic
questions.
A related topic that the witnesses did not address in their prepared
testimony or opening statements, and that the members of the Subcommittee did
not raise, is the appending of search terms to URLs. For example, if a person
were to telephone TLJ and ask if TLJ has published any articles regarding pen
registers, then the government would need a Title III order to obtain that
conversation. If, however, that person went to Google's web site and conducted a
search restricted to the TLJ web site for the words pen and register, then the
URL sent to Google would not only include the Google URL, but also the URL of
the TLJ web site, and the search terms pen and register. The government
witnesses did not address whether this information could be obtained with a
PRTTD order.
On April 6, 2005, when Attorney General Gonzales testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Sen. Russ Feingold
(D-WI) asked about the distinction between content and addressing and
routing information. AG Gonzales did not answer the question.
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House Crime Subcommittee Holds Hearing on
§ 209 of PATRIOT Act, Stored Communications and VOIP |
4/21. The House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Security held oversight hearings
on Thursday, April 21. It addressed among other topics, § 209 of the PATRIOT Act.
§ 209 is titled "Seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants".
This was not a controversial provision during the public debates leading up to
enactment of
the PATRIOT Act in 2001. It was understood by most people as applying to voice mail
messages. However, since 2001, some have argued that the actual language of this section
is far broader in scope, and could affect voice over internet protocol (VOIP) services.
The explanation of this interpretation is somewhat intricate. Moreover, the
government witness on this subject, Laura Parsky, added no clarity at the hearing. In response
to questions on this subject, she evaded, dissembled, and ran out the time clock.
§ 209 provides, in full, as follows:
"Title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 2510--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking beginning with `and such' and all that
follows through `communication'; and
(B) in paragraph (14), by inserting `wire or' after `transmission of';
and
(2) in subsections (a) and (b) of section 2703--
(A) by striking `CONTENTS OF ELECTRONIC' and inserting `CONTENTS OF WIRE
OR ELECTRONIC' each place it appears;
(B) by striking `contents of an electronic' and inserting `contents of a
wire or electronic' each place it appears; and
(C) by striking `any electronic' and inserting `any wire or electronic'
each place it appears."
The first thing that § 209 of the PATRIOT Act did was amend
18
U.S.C. § 2510, which is the definitional section of Chapter 119. That is, Title 18 is the
Criminal Code; Chapter 119 of Title 18 is titled "Wire and Electronic
Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications"; and, §§
2510-2522 comprise Chapter 119. Chapter 119 pertains to wiretaps.
The second thing that § 209 of the PATRIOT Act did was amend
18 U.S.C. § 2703, which is now titled "Required disclosure of customer
communications or records". That is, Chapter 121 of Title 18 is now titled
"Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access".
§§ 2701-2712 comprise Chapter 121. It pertains to stored communications. Notably, the
words "voice mail" do not appear in § 209 of the PATRIOT Act. Most importantly,
what § 209 primarily did was replace the word "electronic" with the words
"wire or electronic" in § 2703, which enables the government to acquired
stored communications.
§ 2703 now provides, in part, that "A governmental
entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication
service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in
electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and
eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant ..." (Emphasis added.)
In 2001 the DOJ represented that this meant that the government could obtain
voice mail under the Stored Communications Act (SCA). That is, the SCA applied to
electronic communications. However, voice mail was a wire communications that
was stored. Wire communications can be obtained with a wiretap order, but that
entails more requirements than a warrant obtained under the SCA.
One witness,
Peter Swire, a law professor at Ohio State University, argued that the § 2703
is now quite broad. He wrote in his
prepared testimony
[12 pages in PDF] that "Section 209 sweeps far more broadly than has been publicly
discussed. What if the contents of ordinary telephone calls become stored as a matter of
routine? This storage is likely to become far more common with the imminent growth of
Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") telephone calls. VoIP uses the
packet-switching network of the Internet to connect telephone calls rather than the
traditional circuit-switching used by established phone systems."
Swire wrote that "Use of VoIP is likely to result in a drastic increase in
storage of the content of telephone calls for at least two reasons. First, the
use of computers for making telephone calls makes it trivially easy for one
party to store the contents of the conversation. This ease of storage comes at a
time of plummeting cost of computer storage, as shown in the enormously greater
size of today’s typical hard drives. Ordinary users may store phone calls in the
future the way they store e-mails and photos today or log their instant message
sessions."
Swire also wrote that "A second technological change with VoIP is the
likelihood that there will be systematic ``caching,´´ or storage, of telephone
communications at the network level. One existing product, for instance, is
called ``CacheEnforcer.´´ CacheEnforcer stores communications for a group of users, such as for a company
or a network operated by a university."
He concluded that "If Section 209 is retained in its current form, then the stored
phone calls of our near future will be available to law enforcement with less
than a probable cause warrant. Now we see how misleading it is to describe
Section 209 as ``seizure of voice mail messages pursuant to warrants.´´ Section
209 applies to all stored ``wire´´
communications (that is, to all stored telephone communications), and not just
to voice mail. In addition, Section 209 would often allow law enforcement access
to these conversations with less than a warrant, such as through a 2703(d)
order." (Parentheses in original.)
He repeated these same arguments in
his oral testimony, and in response to questions.
Swire was able to testify at the hearing about his analysis of the statute.
He was also able to relate discussions during the Clinton administration, for
which he worked. But this was long before passage of the PATRIOT Act. He could
not testify as to how the DOJ interprets this section, how the DOJ is using this
section, or how the DOJ might use this section in the future.
Laura Parsky, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ's Criminal
Division, is the DOJ's lead person on this topic. She was present at the
hearing. She could have addressed the issues raise by Swire. But she did not,
either in her prepared testimony, or in response to questions from the
Subcommittee.
Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC) and
Rep. Bill Delahunt (D-MA) questioned her about the issues
raise by Swire. However, she provided evasive non-responsive answers.
Hence, at the conclusion of the hearing, it remained unclear, from the public
record, how the DOJ interprets and uses § 209, and how this might be affecting
privacy and liberty interests of individuals.
Another issue, that was addressed by witnesses, is what difference does it
make if Swire's analsysis
is correct, and/or if the DOJ does actually use § 209 rather than a Title III
order, for example, to obtain cached files associated with VOIP communications.
Both a stored communications order and a wiretap order require a judge to
issue an order upon a finding of probable cause. Hence, there is a significant
safeguards with both.
However, there are additional things that are required for a Title III order
that are not required for a stored communications order. A wiretap order can
only be issued if the investigation involves one of the enumerated crimes that
can serve as a predicate for the issuance of a wiretap order. Also, a wiretap
order also requires the involvement of a high ranking official of the DOJ.
There is also the matter of suppression of evidence illegally obtained. That
is,
18 U.S.C. § 2515, titled "Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted
wire or oral communications", applies to Title III wiretaps, but not to the
accessing of stored communications.
§ 2515 provides that "Whenever any wire or oral communication has
been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative
committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter."
Finally, it should be noted that the statutory provisions regarding stored
communications also draw distinctions between read and unread e-mail and between newer
and older e-mail, and provide that some is available with a mere subpoena.
TLJ attempted to speak with Laura Parsky about this issue. An assistant told
TLJ that she would not speak with TLJ. TLJ also attempted to speak with someone
in the DOJ's Office of Public Affairs (OPA). No one from the OPA has returned a
phone call from TLJ since Gonzales became Attorney General.
Another witness at the hearing took a broader view of government access to
individual's stored communications. James Dempsey, Executive Director of the
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), wrote in
his prepared testimony
[PDF] that "A storage revolution is sweeping the field of information and
communications technology. Service providers are offering very large quantities of
online storage, for email and potentially for voicemail. Increasingly, technology users
are storing information not in their homes or even on portable devices but on networks,
under the control of service providers who can be served with compulsory process and never
have to tell the subscribers that their privacy has been invaded. New Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) services may include the capability to store past voice
conversations in a way never available before, further obliterating the
distinction between real-time interception and access to stored communications."
He continued that "Section 209 takes a seemingly small category
of information out of the full protection of the Fourth Amendment and moves it
under the lowered protections accorded to remotely stored communications and
data. But stored voicemail is the tip of an iceberg. Increasingly, individuals
are using stored email to store documents, including draft documents on
computers operated by service providers and accessed through a Web interface."
He recommended to the Subcommittee that "Rather than allowing
growing amounts of personal information to fall outside the traditional
protections of the Fourth Amendment, it is time to revisit the rules for
networked storage (whether of voice or data) and bring them more in line with
traditional Fourth Amendment principles, by requiring contemporaneous notice as
the norm and covering both newer records and older records (again, whether voice
or data) under the same probable cause standard. That would be truly technology
neutral and would have the advantage of not allowing technology advances to
erode privacy protections."
Laura Parsky's
prepared testimony [20 pages in PDF] addressed § 209 solely in the context
of voice-mail and e-mail. She wrote that "Section 209 rendered the rules for stored
voicemail messages more consistent with those for other types of stored messages such as
electronic mail (e-mail) and answering machine messages. Prior to the Act, access to
stored voicemails was unnecessarily encumbered by rules designed to apply to on-going
access to live communications rather than the rules for a single access to stored
communications." She did not address VOIP communications.
Nor did Steven Martinez, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI's Cyber Division.
He wrote in his prepared
testimony § 209 "permits law enforcement officers to seize voice
mail with a search warrant rather than a surveillance, or Title III, order." He
added that "The importance of this provision is best understood in the context of
how often terrorists and other criminals rely on technology to relay their plans to each
other instead of risking face-to-face in-person meetings."
§ 209 is not limited to seizures in terrorism related investigations.
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Summary of Title II of the
PATRIOT Act
titled "Enhanced Surveillance Procedures"
(Column one is the section number. Column two is the section title provided by the
Act. Column three indicates whether or not the section is scheduled to
sunset.) |
201 |
Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications
relating to terrorism |
Y |
202 |
Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications
relating to computer fraud and abuse offenses |
Y |
203 |
Authority to share criminal investigation information |
|
(a) |
Authority to share grand jury information |
N |
(b) |
Authority to share electronic, wire and oral interception information |
Y |
(c) |
Procedures |
N |
(d) |
Foreign intelligence information |
Y |
204 |
Clarification of intelligence exceptions from limitations on
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic communication |
Y |
205 |
Employment of translators by the FBI |
N |
206 |
Roving surveillance authority under the FISA |
Y |
207 |
Duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons who are
agents of a foreign power |
Y |
208 |
Designation of judges (under the FISA) |
N |
209 |
Seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants |
Y |
210 |
Scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications |
N |
211 |
CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE (of 47 U.S.C. 631) |
N |
212 |
Emergency disclosure of electronic communications to protect life and
limb |
Y |
213 |
Authority for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant |
N |
214 |
Pen register and trap and trace authority under FISA |
Y |
215 |
Access to records and other items under the FISA |
Y |
216 |
Modification of authorities relating to use of pen register and trap and
trace devices |
N |
217 |
Interception of computer trespasser communications |
Y |
218 |
Foreign intelligence information |
Y |
219 |
Single-jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism |
N |
220 |
Nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence |
Y |
221 |
Trade Sanctions |
N |
222 |
Assistance to law enforcement agencies |
N |
223 |
Civil liability for certain unauthorized disclosures |
Y |
224 |
Sunset |
- |
225 |
Immunity for compliance with FISA wiretap |
Y |
Summary of Selected Sections of Title V
titled "Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism" |
505 |
Miscellaneous National Security Authorities |
|
(a) |
Telephone and Toll Transactional Records |
N |
(b) |
Financial Records |
N |
(c) |
Consumer Reports |
N |
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Notice |
There was no issue of the TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert on Thursday, April
28, 2005. |
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Correction |
The story titled "Supreme Court Rules in Hoffer v. Microsoft"
in TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 1124, April 27, 2004, contained an
error in the title. It should have been titled "Appeals Court
Rules in Hoffer v. Microsoft".
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Washington Tech Calendar
New items are highlighted in red. |
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Friday, April 29 |
The House will not meet. It will next meet on May 2.
The Senate will not meet. It will next meet on May 9.
RESCHEDULED FROM APRIL 28. 9:30 AM. The
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) will hold
an event titled "Open Meeting". See,
agenda [PDF]. The event will be webcast by the FCC. Location: FCC, 445 12th Street,
SW, Room TW-C05 (Commission Meeting Room).
Deadline to submit reply comments to the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in response
to its notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) [460 pages in PDF] in its proceeding titled "In the
Matter of: Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act
of 2004 Implementation of Section 340 of the Communications Act". See also, FCC
release
[PDF]. This NPRM is FCC 05-24 in MB Docket No. 05-49. The FCC adopted this NPRM on
February 4, 2005, and released it on February 7, 2005. See, story titled "FCC
Releases SHVERA NPRM Regarding Significantly Viewed Signals" in TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 1,073, February 9, 2005.
Deadline to submit nomination to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) for membership on its Electronic Tax Administration
Advisory Committee (ETAAC). See, IRS
release and
notice in the Federal Register, February 28, 2005, Vol. 70, No. 38, at
Page 9701-9702.
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Monday, May 2 |
The House will meet at 2:00 PM.
The Senate will not meet on Monday, May 2 through Friday, May 6. See,
Senate calendar.
Day one of a three day event hosted by
Internet2 and titled "Spring 2005 Internet2 Member Meeting". See,
notice. Location:
Crystal Gateway Marriott, 1700 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA.
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Tuesday, May 3 |
10:00 AM. The
House Judiciary Committee's
(HJC) Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security will hold the fifth of
its oversight
hearing on the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. This hearing will
address §§ 201, 202, and 223 (regarding wiretaps), and § 213 (regarding
delayed notice of search warrants). The hearing will be webcast by the HJC.
Press contact: Jeff Lungren or Terry Shawn at 202 225-2492. Location:
Room 2141, Rayburn Building
12:00 NOON - 2:00 PM. The DC
Bar Association will host a panel discussion titled "KP Permanent Make-Up v.
Lasting Impression, Inc.: Fair Use and Likelihood of Confusion". The scheduled
speakers are Beth Brinkmann (Morrison & Foerster, counsel for Lasting Impression),
Patricia Millett (Assistant to the Solicitor General), Christine Farley (American
University Washington law school). See,
notice.
Prices vary from $10 to $30. For more information, call 202-626-3463. Location: D.C.
Bar Conference Center, B-1 Level, 1250 H St., NW.
2:00 PM. The U.S. Court of
Appeals (FedCir) will hear oral argument in Aptix v. Quickturn Design.
This is an appeal from the U.S. District Court
(NDCal) in a patent case. This case is D.C. No. C 98-00762 WHA (EDL) and App. Ct. No.
04-1368. Location: Courtroom 402, 717 Madison Place, NW.
Day two of a three day event hosted by
Internet2 and titled "Spring 2005 Internet2 Member Meeting". See,
notice. Location:
Crystal Gateway Marriott, 1700 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA.
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Wednesday, May 4 |
10:00 AM. The
House Financial Services
Committee will hold a hearing titled "Assessing Data Security:
Preventing Breaches and Protecting Sensitive Information". Location: Room
2128, Rayburn Building.
10:00 AM. The U.S. Court of
Appeals (FedCir) will hear oral argument in Ericsson v. Harris. This is
an appeal from the U.S. District Court (NDTex)
in a patent infringement case involving cellular telephony. This case is D.C. No. 3-98 CV
2903-M and App. Ct. No. 04-1444. Location: Courtroom 203, 717 Madison Place, NW.
1:00 - 5:00 PM. The
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO)
Nanotechnology Customer Partnership will hold a meeting. RSVP to Jill
Warden at jill dot warden at uspto dot gov or 571 272-1267. See,
notice.
Location: USPTO, Madison Auditorium, South Side, 600 Dulany Street,
Alexandria, Virginia.
2:00 - 4:00 PM. The Federal Communications
Commission's (FCC) World RadioCommunication 2007 (WRC-07) Advisory Committee's
Informal Working Group 3: IMT-2000 and 2.5 GHz Sharing Issues will meet. Location:
FCC.
9:00 AM - 6:00 PM. Pulver.com will host
a one day conference titled "IP-Based Communications Policy Summit".
See, conference web site. Location:
Plaza Hotel.
Day three of a three day event hosted by
Internet2 and titled "Spring 2005
Internet2 Member Meeting". See,
notice. Location:
Crystal Gateway Marriott, 1700 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA.
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Thursday, May 5 |
9:15 AM - 12:15 PM. The
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) will host an
event titled "The Effect of Wireless Telecommunications on Economic Development
in Africa". The speakers will be Gregory Sidak (AEI), Leonard Waverman (London
Business School), Edward Graham (Institute for International Economics), Scott
Wallsten (AEI), Diane Coyle (Enlightenment Economics), Neil Gough (Vodafone
Group), and Claude Barfield (AEI). See,
notice and registration page. Location: 12th floor, 1150 17th St., NW.
10:00 AM. The
House Judiciary Committee's (HJC)
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security will hold the sixth of its oversight
hearing on the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. This hearing will address
§ 212, titled "Emergency disclosure of electronic communications to protect life and
limb". The hearing will be webcast by the HJC. Press contact: Jeff Lungren or Terry
Shawn at 202 225-2492. Location: Room 2141, Rayburn Building.
9:30 AM. The U.S. Court of Appeals
(DCCir) will hear oral argument in American Bar Association v. FTC,
No. 04-5257. Judges Sentelle, Randolph and Roberts will preside. Location: Prettyman
Courthouse, 333 Constitution Ave., NW.
Day one of a two day conference hosted by the
Computer Law Association (CLA) titled "CLA
World Computer and Internet Law Conference". See,
conference brochure [PDF].
Location: Park
Hyatt Hotel, 24th at M St. NW.
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Friday, May 6 |
9:30 AM. The U.S. Court of Appeals
(DCCir) will hear oral argument in Preston Small v. FCC, No. 04-1056.
Judges Edwards, Henderson and Tatel will preside. Location: Prettyman Courthouse, 333
Constitution Ave., NW.
10:00 AM. The U.S. Court of Appeals
(FedCir) will hear oral argument in Datamize v. Plumtree Software,
No. 04-1564. This is patent case involving internet portal technology. Location:
Courtroom 203, 717 Madison Place, NW.
12:15 - 1:45 PM. The
New America Foundation (NAF) will
host a brown bag lunch titled "Hot Property: The Threat of Intellectual
Property Theft to our Economy and Safety". The speakers will be Pat Choate,
author of
Hot Property: The Stealing of Ideas in an Age of Globalization
[Amazon], and Barry Lynn (NAF). RSVP to Jennifer Buntman at 202 986-4901 or
buntman at newamerica dot net. See,
notice.
Location: NAF, 1630 Connecticut Ave, 7th Floor.
Day two of a two day conference hosted by the
Computer Law Association (CLA) titled "CLA
World Computer and Internet Law Conference". See,
conference brochure [PDF].
Location: Park
Hyatt Hotel, 24th at M St. NW.
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House Crime Subcommittee Holds Hearing on
§ 217 of PATRIOT Act and Computer Trespassers |
4/21. The House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Security held an oversight hearing
on Thursday, April 21. It addressed among other topics, § 217 of the
PATRIOT Act, titled "Interception of Computer Trespasser Information".
Government witnesses argued that this section is necessary to enable
e-commerce businesses and ISPs to work with law enforcement agencies to catch
computer hackers. Other witnesses argued that there are no protections against
misuse and abuse. The risk, they argued, is that the government, with no court
approval, could monitor the communications of all of the users and customers of
an ISP indefinitely.
§ 217 of the PATRIOT Act added a new subsection (i) to
18
U.S.C. § 2511, which contains the basic prohibition against interception of
communications. § 2511(a) provides that any person who "intentionally intercepts,
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication" shall be punished.
§ 217 adds a new exception for government interception of computer trespassers,
where the owner of the trespassed computer consents. It provides as follows:
"It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color
of law to intercept the wire or electronic communications of a computer
trespasser transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer, if--
(I) the owner or operator of the protected computer authorizes the
interception of the computer trespasser's communications on the protected
computer;
(II) the person acting under color of law is lawfully engaged in an
investigation;
(III) the person acting under color of law has reasonable grounds to
believe that the contents of the computer trespasser's communications will be
relevant to the investigation; and
(IV) such interception does not acquire communications other than those
transmitted to or from the computer trespasser."
§ 217 also amends
18 U.S.C. § 2510, which is the definitional section of Chapter 119. Title 18 is the
Criminal Code; Chapter 119 of Title 18 is titled "Wire and Electronic
Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications"; and, §§
2510-2522 comprise Chapter 119. Chapter 119 pertains to wiretaps. § 217 provides
definitions for the terms "protected computer" and "computer trespasser".
Steven Martinez, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI's Cyber Division, wrote
in his prepared
testimony, that § 217 "makes the law technology-neutral. Section 217 places
cyber-trespassers -- those who are breaking into computers -- on the same footing as
physical intruders. Section 217 allows the victims of computer-hacking crimes voluntarily
to request law enforcement assistance in monitoring trespassers on their computers. Just
as burglary victims have long been able to invite officers into their homes to catch the
thieves, hacking victims can now allow law enforcement officers into their computers to catch
cyber-intruders."
He also argued that § 217 "enhances privacy. First, it is carefully
crafted to ensure that law enforcement conducts monitoring against trespassers
in a manner entirely consistent with protecting the privacy rights of law
abiding citizens. Second, the essence of the section -- to help catch hackers --
serves a vital function in the FBI's ability to enforce data privacy laws."
Martinez concluded that § 217 "has played a key role in a variety
of hacking cases, including investigations into hackers’ attempts to compromise military
computer systems. Allowing section 217 to expire at the end of this year would help
computer hackers avoid justice and prevent law enforcement from responding
quickly to victims who are themselves asking for help."
Laura Parsky, a Deputy Assistant Attorneys General in the DOJ's
Criminal Division, wrote in her
prepared testimony
[20 pages in PDF] that this section "brought criminal procedures up to date with
modern technology", and that it "did not adversely affect any legitimate privacy
rights".
She also argued that "Because computer owners
often lack the expertise, equipment, or financial resources required to monitor
their systems themselves, they commonly have no effective way to exercise their
rights to protect themselves from unauthorized attackers."
Both Parsky and Martinez used the analogy of home owners. They said that
owners can invite the police into their homes to arrest a buglar. They argued
that operators of computer systems should be able to do the same to enable
police to catch computer hackers.
The analogy has limitations. In the case of homeowners and burglars, there
are no third parties. In contrast, when police, or the FBI's cyber division,
monitor a computer system, they may access the communications, not only of the
computer trespassers, but also the legitimate users of that computer system.
Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC) asked the
government witnesses who it is under § 217 that has an expectation of privacy.
Parsky responded by discussing the threats posed by computer hackers,
including identity theft. Martinez discussed how the government works
cooperatively with e-commerce businesses.
Peter Swire,
a law professor at Ohio State University, said that it is the e-commerce
customers and e-mail users who have an expectation of privacy.
Parsky said that this is a consent situation. Swire shook his head in disbelief.
Swire provided
prepared testimony [12 pages in PDF]. He wrote that § 217 "lacks logical safeguards
against abuse."
He argued that § 217 should, and as drafted, does, "enable
system owners and law enforcement to coordinate effectively in facing hacker
attacks". He also argued that § 217 "should not become a license for widespread
wiretapping by law enforcement." He argued that as drafted, it fails on
this second criteria.
The first problem, according to Swire, is there is no requirement that the
authorization from the owner of the computer system be in writing.
"It will provide the name of the person inside the organization
who takes responsibility for inviting law enforcement to review the e-mails and
other computer traffic at the organization. If there is any dispute after the
fact about what happened, law enforcement will have the benefit of being able to
show the authorization. The system owner or operator will have the benefit of
knowing that an employee has taken a proven, written step to authorize law
enforcement to enter. That will reduce the risk that any law enforcement
officers will talk their way into a computer system without true consent by the
system owner. In addition, customers and users of the system will have the
benefit of knowing that the system owner actually did consent to having
communications monitored", wrote Swire.
Swire also argued that there should be a reporting requirement, to disclose
"how often and in what contexts Section 217 has been used".
Finally, Swire argued that "there should be a statutory
suppression remedy for exceeding the scope of permitted wiretapping".
Swire offered one possible scenario: "suppose that law enforcement arm-twists
a major ISP to let law enforcement camp at the ISP and look at all the e-mails.
Under current Section 217, all of the e-mails of all of the users could become
grist for future investigations. All of them could be used in subsequent trials,
against ordinary e-mail users who had no connection at all to computer hacking."
He concluded that "The lack of a suppression
remedy means that law enforcement can violate the wiretap laws with respect to
e-mail and web surfing with essentially no legal repercussion."
Jim Dempsey, Executive Director of the Center
for Democracy and Technology, was similarly critical of § 217.
He wrote in his
prepared testimony [8 pages in PDF] that it allows "off the books
surveillance". There is no judicial order, no report to a court, no time limits on
intercepts, no notice to the people whose communications have been intercepted, and no
reporting of data to the Congress.
Dempsey argued that except in the case of emergency intercepts, there should
be a requirement that the government obtain a Title III wiretap order, and the
statutory suppression rule should apply.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Rep.
Bobby Scott (D-VA), the ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee, asked about
the consequences, "if AOL doesn't care about our privacy".
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House Crime Subcommittee Holds Hearing on
Library and ISP Records and § 215 of the Patriot Act and National Security
Letters |
4/28. The House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Security held oversight hearings on Thursday
morning, April 28. It addressed among other topics, § 215 of the PATRIOT Act.
§ 215 of the PATRIOT Act is perhaps the most controversial of the provisions
set to sunset at the end of this year. It pertains to access to business records
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, library records
are a form of business records, and interest groups such as the
American Library Association (ALA) oppose the
provision. In contrast, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) remains adamant about the importance of extending this provision.
§ 215 of the PATRIOT Act is titled "Access to records and other items under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act". The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) only applies to foreign powers, and agents of foreign
powers, including international terrorists. § 501 of the FISA enables the FBI to
obtain from a judge or magistrate an order requiring the production business
records. While the statute does not expressly include library records, it is not
disputed that library records could be obtained.
§ 215 rewrote § 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
which is codified in Title 50 as § 1861. It pertains to "Access to Certain
Business Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism
Investigations". § 215 (of the PATRIOT Act) replaced §§ 501-503 (of the FISA)
with new language designated as §§ 501 and 502.
Currently, § 501 (as amended by § 215) requires that an application to a
judge or magistrate "shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an
authorized investigation conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities." Allowing § 215 to sunset would raise the standards for
obtaining a FISA order for business records.
The Subcommittee heard from three current or former DOJ employees. James Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy at the DOJ, wrote in his
prepared testimony that § 215 "allows the FBI to obtain business records or
other tangible things under FISA pursuant to a FISA Court order if the items
relate to an ongoing authorized national security investigation ..."
Baker also addressed libraries. He wrote that "Prosecutors have always been
able to obtain records from libraries and bookstores through grand jury
subpoenas. Libraries and booksellers should not become safe havens for
terrorists and spies. While section 215 has never been used to obtain such
records, last year, a member of a terrorist group closely affiliated with al
Queda used Internet service provided by a public library to communicate with his
confederates. Furthermore, we know that spies have used public library computers
to do research to further their espionage and to communicate with their
co-conspirators."
Kenneth Wainstain, interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, wrote
in his prepared testimony that "Asking law enforcement to effectively
investigate and prosecute crime without using grand-jury subpoenas to obtain
records would be like asking Tiger Woods to win the Masters without using a
putter."
Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC) asked the
government witnesses if the 9/11 terrorists used libraries. Wainstain responded
that several had. A member of the Committee staff told TLJ that this was the
first time that the DOJ publicly disclosed this.
The Committee promptly transcribed the relevant portion of Wainstain's
response.
He stated that "Investigators received information that
individuals believed to be Wail Al Shehri, Waleed Al Shehri, and Marwan Al
Shehhi visited the Delray Beach Public Library, in Delray Beach, Florida. Wail
Al Shehri and Waleed Al Shehri entered the library one afternoon in July of 2001
and asked to use the library’s computers to access the Internet. After about an
hour, a third man, Marwan Al Shehhi, joined the two. Waleed and Wail Al Shehri
were hijackers aboard American Airlines Flight 11, while Al Shehhi was the pilot
who took control of United Airlines Flight 175. Both of those flights crashed
into the World Trade Center on September 11th." See, HJC
release [2 pages in PDF]
"A witness, who recognized photos of the three individuals that
ran in newspaper articles after September 11, provided the information about the
Delray Beach library visit. While no records exist to confirm the hijackers’
visit to the Delray Beach library, the timing, location, and behavior described
by the witness are consistent with other information gathered in the course of
the investigation", said Wainstain.
"In addition, investigators tracing the activities of the
hijackers determined that, on four occasions in August of 2001, individuals
using Internet accounts registered to Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al Mihdar -- 9/11
hijackers -- used public access computers in the library of a state college in
New Jersey. The computers in the library were used to review and order airline
tickets on an Internet travel reservations site. Al Hazmi and Al Mihdar were
hijackers aboard American Airlines Flight 77, which took off from Dulles Airport
and crashed into the Pentagon. The last documented visit to the library occurred
on August 30, 2001. On that occasion, records indicate that a person using Al
Hazmi’s account used the library’s computer to review September 11 reservations
that had been previously booked", said Wainstain.
In addition, Rep. James
Sensenbrenner (R-WI), the Chairman of the full Committee, who was not
present for this exchange, commented on it in the HJC release.
He stated that "Today we learned the 9/11 murderers used our public libraries
to access the Internet and help plan their travel prior to 9/11. This newly
released information demonstrates the critical importance of the PATRIOT Act’s
Section 215, which allows for the production of business records with a FISA
court order. Section 215 provides -- with appropriate safeguards -- the tools
necessary to help disrupt and prevent future terrorist attacks. We put
Americans' lives at risk if we foolishly provide sanctuaries -- even in our
public libraries -- for terrorists to operate."
Rep. Dan Lungren (R-CA) and
Rep. Louie Gohmert (R-TX), who are
defending the DOJ and the PATRIOT Act at these hearings, emphasized this
revelation.
In contrast, Rep. John
Conyers (D-MI), the ranking Democrat on the Committee, stated that the
Committee only gets information when the DOJ's surveillance powers are about to
expire. And, "other than that, we get stiffed".
Gregory Nojeim, of the ACLU, offered an opposing viewpoint. First, while the
agenda for this hearing specified § 215 and § 206 (regarding roving
wiretaps in FISA investigations), Nojeim said that the Committee should consider
§ 215 and § 505(a) (which pertains to national security letters) in conjunction.
The gist of his argument was that even if the Congress amended § 215 to exempt library records, the FBI could still obtain a library's
internet use records from its ISP with a national security letter under the new
powers provided by § 505(a) of the PATRIOT Act. Nojeim noted that this would
only provide the FBI with internet use records, and not with the library's book
checkout records.
He elaborated in his written testimony that "For both section 215 records
searches and national security letters, the Patriot Act removed from the law the
requirement that the records being produced pertain to an ``agent of a foreign
power,´´ -- that is, foreign countries, businesses, and terrorist organizations.
This significantly expanded law enforcement access to records pertaining to
Americans. In these days of data mining, one cannot ignore this stark fact:
under these provisions, the government can easily obtain records pertaining to
thousands of Americans who have nothing to do with terrorism, so long as the
records are sought for, or are allegedly relevant to, one of these
investigations."
He also stated that the PATRIOT Act "expanded national security letter
authority to allow the FBI to issue a letter compelling Internet Service
Providers ... to produce records about people who use or benefit from their
services."
Nojeim also contradicted the government witnesses' claims that § 215 makes
the FISA process more like a criminal grand jury subpoena. He argued that in
contrast, § 215 and § 505(a) "indicate that the recipient can tell no one that
the recipient has received the order or letter, including any attorney with whom
they may like to consult." That is, a recipient can challenge a subpoena, but
not a § 215 or national security letter. Nojeim called this a "gag".
Earlier this month Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated that the DOJ now interprets the national security letter
statute to allow a recipient to consult an attorney. James Baker repeated this
at the April 28 hearing.
Nojeim countered that "they took this position after we sued them".
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About Tech Law Journal |
Tech Law Journal publishes a free access web site and
subscription e-mail alert. The basic rate for a subscription
to the TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert is $250 per year. However, there
are discounts for subscribers with multiple recipients. Free one
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subscriptions are available for journalists,
federal elected officials, and employees of the Congress, courts, and
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free access. However, copies of the TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert are not
published in the web site until one month after writing. See, subscription
information page.
Contact: 202-364-8882.
P.O. Box 4851, Washington DC, 20008.
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Copyright 1998 - 2005 David Carney, dba Tech Law Journal. All
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