4/14. Justice John Paul Stevens, who has served on the Supreme Court since
1975, announced on April 9, 2010, that he will retire when the Court completes
its current term this summer. This article reviews his contributions to
technology related areas of law.
Outline of Article:
1. Summary.
2. Copyright Cases.
3. State Immunity in IPR Cases.
4. Patent Cases.
5. Communications Cases.
6. Internet Speech Cases.
7. Privacy Cases.
8. Other Cases.
1. Summary.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in the 1984 landmark Sony
Betamax case. It was a 5-4 opinion. He joined in the unanimous 2005 opinion in MGM v.
Grokster, regarding vicarious copyright infringement by the distributors of peer
to peer systems. He wrote a long and vigorous dissent in Eldred, the 7-2 case
regarding the Copyright Term Extension Act.
Justice Stevens led the fight against extending sovereign immunity to states for
violation of, among other things, intellectual property laws. He dissented from the outset,
and never considered the Court to be constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis.
However, his concern was with the conservatives' interpretation of states
rights, not incenting the creation of intellectual property.
Justice Stevens wrote for a unanimous Court in Illinois Tools Works v.
Independent Ink. Otherwise, he has not been active in writing opinions in
patent cases in recent years.
Justice Stevens has been an ardent advocate of freedom of speech on the
internet. He wrote the majority opinion in Reno v. ACLU in 1997, overturning the
censoring provisions of the Communications Decency Act. He dissented from the
Court's 2003 opinion in
US v. American Library Association upholding the Children's Internet
Protection Act (CIPA), which required filtering on certain government subsidized
computers. He wrote a concurring opinion in 2004 in Ashcroft v. ACLU,
holding unconstitutional the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).
Justice Stevens' dedication to freedom of speech also led him to write the majority
opinion in 2001 in Bartnicki v. Vopper, which limited electronic privacy and condoned
violation of the Wiretap Act.
However, he reiterated his slight regard for privacy and Fourth Amendment
rights by authoring the dissent in 2001 in Kyllo v. U.S, a case holding
that the thermal imaging of a home to detect lamps used for growing marijuana
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Stevens has not been active in writing majority or dissenting
opinions in communications law cases. However, last year in a dissent in FCC v.
Fox, he wrote a significant explanation of the nature of the administrative
process. He presented an explanation of the FCC as an agent of the Congress.
Finally, Justice Stevens should be remembered for authoring the Court's 1984
opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837. This is not a communications or technology case. However, this
case regarding administrative procedure gives the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) wide latitude to write regulations that give wild and
implausible interpretations to federal statutes.
2. Copyright Cases.
Justice Stevens has not been a consistent supporter of the copyright based industries.
He wrote the majority opinion in the Sony Betamax case, and wrote a vehement
dissent in Eldred, the Copyright Term Extension Act case. On the other hand, he has
been the Court's most active critic of the line of cases granting states
immunity in intellectual property cases.
Sony. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority in the Court's 1984 5-4
opinion
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417.
He wrote that the "sale of video cassette recorders (``VCR´´s) did not
subject Sony to contributory copyright liability, even though Sony knew as a
general matter that the machines could be used, and were being used, to infringe
the plaintiffs' copyrighted works. Because video tape recorders were capable of
both infringing and ``substantial noninfringing uses,´´ generic or
``constructive´´ knowledge of infringing activity was insufficient to warrant
liability based on the mere retail of Sony’s products."
MGM v. Grokster. Justice Stevens joined in, but did not write, the Supreme
Court's unanimous 2005
opinion [55 pages in PDF] in MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.
In this case, the Court reversed the judgment of the
U.S. Court of Appeals (9thCir)
regarding vicarious copyright infringement by the distributors of peer to peer
systems. The Supreme Court held that "one who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties." See,
story
titled "Supreme Court Rules in MGM v. Grokster" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 1,163, June 28, 2005.
Copyright Term Extension Act. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority
in the Court's 2003
7-2 opinion in Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186. This opinion upheld the constitutionality of the Copyright
Term Extension Act (CTEA), which retroactively extended the maximum duration of copyrights.
See also, story
titled "Supreme Court Upholds CTEA in Eldred v. Ashcroft" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 584, January 16, 2003.
Both Breyer and Stevens dissented. Stevens wrote a long and emphatic
criticism of the CTEA and the majority opinion. He stated that "By failing to
protect the public interest in free access to the products of inventive and
artistic genius -- indeed, by virtually ignoring the central purpose of the
Copyright/Patent Clause -- the Court has quitclaimed to Congress its principal
responsibility in this area of the law. Fairly read, the Court has stated that
Congress' actions under the Copyright/Patent Clause are, for all intents and
purposes, judicially unreviewable. That result cannot be squared with the basic
tenets of our constitutional structure. It is not hyperbole to recall the
trenchant words of Chief Justice John Marshall: ``It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.´´ Marbury
v. Madison ..."
Fair Use and Copying of Unpublished Works. Justice O'Connor wrote for
the majority, which Justice Stevens joined, in the 1985 6-3
opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 539. The Court held that the unpublished state of a work of authorship may
defeat the affirmative defense of fair use.
Database Protection. Justice O'Connor wrote the 8-0-1 1991
opinion in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340. Justice
Stevens joined in O'Connor's opinion. Justice Blackmun concurred without writing an opinion.
The Court held that collections of data, such as electronic databases, are generally not
subject to copyright protection.
Fair Use and Parody. Justice Souter wrote the unanimous 1984
opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1984). Justice
Stevens joined in this opinion. This was the dispute involving the hideous and commercial
parody of Roy Obison's classic titled "Oh, Pretty Woman". The Court reversed the
Court of Appeals, which had held that the defense of fair use was barred by the song's
commercial character and excessive borrowing.
3. State Immunity in IPR Cases.
In the late 1990s the Supreme Court held
in a series of 5-4 opinions that states have immunity from suits for money
judgments in federal court for violation of intellectual property and other
statutes. The Court's reasoning was weak and tenuous at best. Several Justices,
including Stevens, continuously dissented.
Stevens' retirement from the Court removes one vote towards a five member
majority for reversing or limiting this line of cases. There were once four
consistent votes against state sovereign immunity in IP cases: Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer. Souter was replaced by Justice Sonia Sotomayor last year.
Now Justice Stevens in leaving. There remain three consistent votes in favor of
state sovereign immunity: Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy.
Obama, both as Senator and President, has not shown any particular affinity
for the doctrine of states rights. Moreover, his judicial appointments to date,
and especially Justice Sotomayor and his Second Circuit appointments, suggest
that he will be sympathetic to the interests of the copyright industries.
Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion in the
seminal case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996). This case involves the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the Indian
Commerce clause of the constitution. He wrote that the Congress lacks authority
under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate the states' 11th Amendment
immunity from suit in federal courts. However, its holding regarding the
abrogation of state sovereign immunity serves as the precedent for similar cases
involving intellectual property. This was a 5-4 opinion.
Stevens wrote in his dissent that "This case is about power -- the power of
the Congress of the United States to create a private federal cause of action
against a State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal right." He
wrote that the majority opinion "prevents Congress from providing a federal
forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in
copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and
the regulation of our vast national economy."
Stevens argued that "There may be room for debate over whether, in light of
the Eleventh Amendment, Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of
action may be enforced in federal court by a citizen of another State or a
foreign citizen. There can be no serious debate, however, over whether Congress
has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen
of the State being sued. Congress' authority in that regard is clear."
Next came Rehnquist's
opinion in Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999), invalidating the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act.
This too was a 5-4 opinion. Justice Stevens wrote the long and strenuous dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter.
At the same time, the Court issued its
opinion in College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666
(1999), invalidating the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act. Scalia wrote this 5-4 opinion.
Both Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer wrote dissenting opinions.
As a result of these cases, states can hold intellectual property, and enforce their
intellectual property rights in federal court. At the same same, states are in effect free
to steal the intellectual property of others, without fear of a money judgments against
them. Some states infringe intellectual property rights, hide behind 11th Amendment
immunity, and lobby their Senators to block legislation that would remedy this situation.
In 2006 the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Central
Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356. This is an 11th Amendment case
involving the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of preferential transfers by a debtor to state
entities. The Supreme Court held, 5-4, that the Congress can abrogate state sovereign
immunity in the Bankruptcy Code. However, its analysis is equally applicable to the Patent
Act or Copyright Act.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion. He commanded a majority because Justice
O'Connor switched sides. This opinion cannot be reconciled with the 1990s IP opinions.
See also, story
titled "Supreme Court Rules in State Sovereign Immunity Case" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 1,295, January 24, 2006. See also, story titled "Supreme Court
Grants Certiorari in State Sovereign Immunity Case" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 1,109, April 5, 2005.
Some members of Congress attempted to remedy this situation by legislation. However,
they failed. See, stories titled "Legislators Introduce Bills to Address Infringement
by States" in TLJ Daily
E-Mail Alert No. 302, November 6, 2001; "Sen. Leahy Reintroduces Bill to Close
11th Amendment Loophole to IPR" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No.
394, March 22, 2002; "Senate Judiciary Committee Considers Federalism and Intellectual
Property" in TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 522, October 3, 2002; and "Legislators Re-Introduce Bills to Address State
IPR Sovereign Immunity" in TLJ
Daily E-Mail Alert No. 680, June 13, 2003.
4. Patent Cases.
Justice Stevens wrote for a unanimous Court in Illinois Tools Works v.
Independent Ink. Otherwise, he has not been active in writing opinions in
patent cases in recent years.
Illinois Tools Works v. Independent Ink. Justice Stevens wrote the unanimous
March 1, 2006, opinion
[20 pages in PDF] of the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, a
patent tying antitrust case. See,
story titled
"Supreme Court Vacates in Patent Tying Antitrust Case" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No.
1,321, March 2, 2006.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
U.S. Court of Appeals (FedCir) and remanded. The
Court of Appeals held in January of 2005 that "a rebuttable presumption of market
power arises from the possession of a patent over a tying product".
The Supreme Court concluded that "Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies,
and most economists have all reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily
confer market power upon the patentee. Today, we reach the same conclusion, and therefore
hold that, in all cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant has market power in the tying product."
eBay v. MercExchange. Justice Thomas wrote the unanimous
opinion in 2006 in
eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388. Justice Stevens joined in this opinion, and in
a concurring opinion written by Kennedy. The Court held that the traditional four factor
framework that guides a court's decision whether to grant an injunction applies in patent
cases. See, story
titled "Supreme Court to Consider Availability of Injunctive Relief in Patent
Cases" in TLJ Daily
E-Mail Alert No. 1,261, November 29, 2005, and
story
titled "Supreme Court Rules on Availability of Injunctive Relief in Patent
Cases" in TLJ Daily
E-Mail Alert No. 1,371, May 16, 2006.
Patent Obviousness. Justice Kennedy wrote the unanimous 2007
opinion in
KSR International v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398. Justice Stevens joined in
this opinion. See, story titled "Supreme Court Rules on Patent Obviousness in
KSR v. Teleflex" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No. 1,576, May 7, 2007.
MedImmune v. Genentech. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in the Court's
2007 8-1 opinion in MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118. Justice Stevens joined
in Scalia's opinion. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent. This is a case regarding when a patent
can be challenged by a licensee in a declaratory judgment action. See, story titled
"Supreme Court Rules on Case or Controversy Requirement in Patent Litigation" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No.
1,516, January 9, 2007.
Doctrine of Equivalents. Justice Kennedy wrote the unanimous 2002
opinion in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722.
Justice Stevens joined in that opinion. The Court again affirmed the doctrine of equivalents,
articulated its purpose, held that the narrowing of a patent claim may give rise to
prosecution history estoppel (but that it does not absolutely bar application of the doctrine
of equivalents), and listed circumstances under which it might or might not operate as a bar.
See also, story titled "Supreme Court Reverses in Festo Case" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No.
439, May 29, 2002.
Carlsbad Technology v. HIF Bio. Justice Thomas wrote the unanimous 2009
opinion in Carlsbad
Technology v. HIF Bio, 556 U.S. __. This is a case regarding federal appellate court
jurisdiction. Stevens wrote one of three concurring opinion. See, story titled "Supreme
Court Reverses in Carlsband Technology v. HIF Bio" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No.
1,934, May 5, 2009.
5. Communications Cases.
Justice Stevens has not been active in writing majority or dissenting opinions in
communications cases.
However, in 2009 he wrote a dissent in a broadcast case in which he made a key observation
about the nature of the administrative process. He also wrote that the FCC is essentially
"an agent of Congress" to which the Congress delegates legislative authority to
write rules that "reflect the views of the Congress".
Section 251 Regulation. Justice Stevens joined in Justice Scalia's
majority opinion
in 1999 in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366.
FCC Price Regulation. Justice Stevens joined with the majority in the
Court's 2002 5-3 opinion
in Verizon v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, upholding the FCC's rules
regarding how incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) charge interexchange
carriers (IXCs) and competitors local exchange carriers (CLECs) for access to
their facilities. See, story titled
"Supreme Court Upholds FCC Pricing Rules" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 431, May 14, 2002.
Antitrust and Telecom: Trinko. Justice Scalia wrote the 2004
opinion in Verizon
v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, holding that a claim alleging a breach of an ILEC's duty under
the 1996 Telecom Act to share its network with competitors does not state a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion "concurring in the judgment" of the
Court. Justices Souter and Thomas joined. Stevens wrote that it was AT&T, and
not Trinko, who was injured by Verizon's conduct, and therefore, under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, only AT&T has standing to raise the antitrust claim.
Stevens concluded "I would not decide the merits of the § 2 claim unless and
until such a claim is advanced by either AT&T or a similarly situated
competitive local exchange carrier."
See also, story
titled "Supreme Court Holds That There is No Sherman Act Claim in Verizon v.
Trinko" in TLJ
Daily E-Mail Alert No. 815, January 14, 2004.
Antitrust and Telecom: Pacific Bell v. Linkline. Chief Justice Roberts
wrote for the majority in the 2009 5-4
opinion in
Pacific Bell v. Linkline, 555 U.S. __. Justice Breyer wrote a concurring
opinion, joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.
This issue was whether "a plaintiff states a claim under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act by alleging that the defendant -- a vertically integrated retail
competitor with an alleged monopoly at the wholesale level but no antitrust duty
to provide the wholesale input to competitors -- engaged in a ``price squeeze´´
by leaving insufficient margin between wholesale and retail prices to allow the
plaintiff to compete." The majority held not. The four concurring justices would
have sent the case back to the District Court to consider a predatory pricing
claim.
See, stories titled "Supreme Court Reverses in Pacific Bell v. Linkline",
"Supreme Court: There Is Robust Competition in the Broadband Market", and
"Commentary: Impact of Pacific Bell v. LinkLine" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 1,906, February 27, 2009.
State Statutes that Bar Local Governments from Providing Telecom Services.
Justice Souter wrote the 2004
opinion in Nixon v.
Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125. This is a case
regarding 47 U.S.C. §
253(a) and state statutes that prohibit political subdivisions from offering
telecommunications services. Missouri passed a state statute that bans local governments in
Missouri from offering telecommunications services. The local governments,
represented by the Missouri Municipal League, wanted the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to preempt this statute, under Section 253, which provides that
states cannot ban "any entity" from providing telecommunications services. It
has always been clear that Section 253 means that states cannot bar any company
from providing telecommunications services. The question was, does Section 253
also include local governments. The FCC said no. The 8th Circuit said yes. The
Supreme Court said no. Of course, this does not mean that states must bar local
governments from providing telecommunications services. This opinion only stands
for the proposition that states may bar local governments from providing
telecommunications services.
Justice Stevens wrote a solo dissent. He would have affirmed the judgment of
the 8th Circuit. See also,
story
titled "Supreme Court Reverses in Nixon v. Missouri" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 864, March 26, 2004.
Cell Towers. Justice Scalia wrote the 2005
opinion in Rancho
Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, holding that an individual who brings an action
to enforce the limitations on state and local authority to regulate the location,
construction, and modification of wireless communications facilities under
47 U.S.C. § 332,
cannot also recover damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Justice Stevens wrote a solo concurring opinion. He concurred with the Court's
conclusion as to Section 332. However, he wrote that the Court has not "properly
acknowledged the strength of our normal presumption that Congress intended to preserve,
rather than preclude, the availability of §1983 as a remedy for the enforcement of federal
statutory rights."
See also, story titled "Supreme Court Holds That Individuals Who Sue Under §332
Cannot Also Recover Damages Under §1983" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail Alert No.
1,101, March 23, 2005.
Broadband Internet Access Service. Justice Stevens joined with the majority in
the Court's 2005
opinion
[59 pages in PDF] in NCTA v. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967. This opinion upheld
the FCC's determination that cable broadband internet access service is an information
service. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion of the Court.
Justice Stevens wrote a two sentence solo concurring opinion in which he
commented on Chevron deference. He wrote that Justice Thomas's opinion
"correctly explains why a court of appeals' interpretation of an ambiguous
provision in a regulatory statute does not foreclose a contrary reading by the
agency. That explanation would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by
this Court that would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity."
See also, story titled "Supreme Court Rules in Brand X Case" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 1,163, June 28, 2005.
FCC Regulation of Broadcast Speech. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in
the 2009 5-4 opinion
[PDF] in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. __. In this case, the
FCC issued an order that fined broadcasters for fleeting expletives. The Court
of Appeals vacated and remanded, on the grounds that the FCC's new fleeting
expletives policy is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) for failing to articulate a reasoned basis for the change in policy.
The Supreme Court reversed on the basis APA does not preclude unexplained shifts
of long standing policy.
Justice Stevens joined in the dissent. See, story titled "Supreme Court
Reverses in FCC v. Fox" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 1,932, April 28, 2009.
FCC Rulemaking Process. In FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Justice Stevens also wrote a solo opinion that delved into the nature of the
administrative process.
"Apparently assuming that the Federal Communications Commission's ...
rulemaking authority is a species of executive power, the Court espouses the
novel proposition that the Commission need not explain its decision to discard a
longstanding rule in favor of a dramatically different approach to regulation."
He continued that the Constitution disperses the federal power among the three
branches --legislative, the executive, and judicial. Moreover, "Strict lines of
authority are particularly elusive when Congress and the President both exert a
measure of control over an agency."
But, he wrote that "when Congress grants rulemaking and adjudicative
authority to an expert agency composed of commissioners selected through a
bipartisan procedure and appointed for fixed terms, it substantially insulates
the agency from executive control."
"Just as the FCC’s commissioners do not serve at the will of the President",
Stevens wrote, "its regulations are not subject to change at the President's
will. And when the Commission fashions rules that govern the airwaves, it
exercises legislative power delegated to it by Congress."
Justice Stevens, quoting from the Supreme Court's 1935
opinion in Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602, stated that "the
FCC ``cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive´´
and is better viewed as an agent of Congress established ``to carry into effect
legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard
therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative ...
aid.´´"
"There should be a strong presumption that the FCC's initial views,
reflecting the informed judgment of independent commissioners with expertise in
the regulated area, also reflect the views of the Congress", opined Stevens.
6. Internet Speech Cases.
Communications Decency Act. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority in the 1997 7-2
opinion in Reno v. ACLU, 521 US 845. This case held that the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. All of the
Justices, except Rehnquist and O'Connor joined.
Internet Filtering. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority in the 2003
opinion in US v.
American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194. This case upheld the constitutionality
of the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), which provides that for
libraries to receive federal subsidies or grants, they must use internet
filtering technologies. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent.
The CIPA statute, which was enacted by the 106th Congress, requires schools
and libraries receiving e-rate subsidies, pursuant to a
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) program loosely
based on 47 U.S.C. §
254(h)(1)(B), and libraries receiving grants under the Library Services and
Technology Act (LSTA) (20
U.S.C. § 9101 et seq.), as a condition for receiving subsidies or grants, to
use filtering technologies on computers with internet access that are used by
children, and to filter images that constitute obscenity or child pornography.
A three judge panel of the U.S.
District Court (EDPa) held the statute unconstitutional as a violation of
the First Amendment. It held that filtering software is a content based
restriction on access to a public forum, and is therefore subject to the strict
scrutiny test -- that is, it must be necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental interest, and be narrowly tailored to further that interest. The
District Court held that the federal government has a compelling interest in
preventing the dissemination of obscenity, child pornography, or, in the case of
minors, material harmful to minors. However, it found that mandating the use of
filters is not narrowly tailored to further those interests.
The Supreme Court reversed. Justices wrote several opinions. No one opinion
was joined by a majority of the Court. However, six Justices joined in opinions
stating that the CIPA is constitutional. Rehnquist wrote an opinion that was
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas. In addition, Justice Kennedy
wrote an opinion, that was joined by Justice Breyer, that concurred as to the
judgment of constitutionality, but offered a different analysis.
Rehnquist first reviewed the nature of internet access and filtering
software. He wrote "there is also an enormous amount of pornography on the
Internet, much of which is easily obtained. ... The accessibility of this
material has created serious problems for libraries, which have found that
patrons of all ages, including minors, regularly search for online pornography.
... Some patrons also expose others to pornographic images by leaving them
displayed on Internet terminals or printed at library printers. ... Upon
discovering these problems, Congress became concerned that the E-rate and LSTA
programs were facilitating access to illegal and harmful pornography."
Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent that "it is neither inappropriate nor
unconstitutional for a local library to experiment with filtering software as a
means of curtailing children’s access to Internet Web sites displaying sexually
explicit images. ... Whether it is constitutional for the Congress of the United
States to impose that requirement ... raises a vastly different question."
He wrote that "Because the software relies on key words or phrases to block
undesirable sites, it does not have the capacity to exclude a precisely defined
category of images." He stated that it both underblocks, by allowing undesirable
sites through, and overblocks, by blocking non-objectionable web sites.
He wrote that "the software's reliance on words to identify undesirable sites
necessarily results in the blocking of thousands of pages that ``contain content
that is completely innocuous for both adults and minors, and that no rational
person could conclude matches the filtering companies' category definitions,
such as `pornography´ or `sex.´ ´´ ... In my judgment, a
statutory blunderbuss that mandates this vast amount of ``overblocking´´
abridges the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment."
See also, story titled "Supreme Court Upholds Children's Internet Protection
Act" in TLJ Daily
E-Mail Alert No. 686, June 24, 2003.
COPA. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Stevens
joined, in the 2004 5-4
opinion in Ashcroft
v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656. This was a a constitutional challenge to the Child Online
Protection Act (COPA). Stevens also wrote a concurring opinion.
The COPA provided, in part, that "Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the
character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the
World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to
any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not
more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both."
The COPA further provided that "It is an affirmative defense to prosecution
under this section that the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by
minors to material that is harmful to minors ... by requiring use of a credit
card".
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction of the COPA. The U.S. Court of
Appeals (3rdCir) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, and remanded.
In addition, Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Ginsburg
joined. He wrote that "I continue to believe that the Government may not penalize
speakers for making available to the general World Wide Web audience that which the least
tolerant communities in America deem unfit for their children’s consumption, ... and
consider that principle a sufficient basis for deciding this case."
He added that "encouraging deployment of user-based controls, such as
filtering software, would serve Congress’ interest in protecting minors from
sexually explicit Internet materials as well or better than attempting to
regulate the vast content of the World Wide Web at its source, and at a far less
significant cost to First Amendment values."
See also, story titled "Supreme Court Affirms Preliminary Injunction of COPA"
in TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 928, June 29, 2004.
7. Privacy Cases.
Electronic Privacy. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority in the
Supreme Court 2001 6-3
opinion in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514. The Court held that a
radio host cannot be sued under
18 U.S.C. § 2511 for playing an audio recording of a cellular telephone
conversation, despite a federal statute that made illegal both the interception
of the conversation, and its disclosure.
Justice Stevens reasoned that the case pitted statutes banning disclosure of
illegally obtained electronic communications against the First Amendment freedom
of speech claims of persons with illegally obtained recordings to disclose them
if their content pertains to a public issue.
While Justice Stevens and the majority may have defended First Amendment rights, they
did so at the expense of privacy rights. See also,
story
titled "Supreme Court Diminishes Electronic Privacy" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 192, May 22, 2001.
Thermal Imaging. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in the Court's 5-4 2001
opinion in Kyllo
v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27. The majority held that the thermal imaging of a home to detect
lamps used for growing marijuana constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court further held that such searches are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment unless supported by probable cause and authorized by a warrant.
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, which was joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor
and Kennedy. He reasoned that the police did not enter the house search, so there was no
search. Under this reasoning, police computer intrusions, or searches of files stored in
the cloud, would not be protected by the 4th Amendment.
8. Other Cases.
Internet Wine Sales. Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority in the Court's
2005 5-4 opinion
in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460. Justice Stevens wrote one of two dissents.
The Court held that Michigan's and New York's regulatory schemes that permit in-state
wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers, but restrict the ability of out-of-state
wineries to do so, violate the dormant commerce clause. See also, story titled "Supreme
Court Rules in Internet Wine Sales Case" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 1,137, May 17, 2005.
The commerce clause is one of the few legal defenses that internet retailers
have against burdensome, protectionist, and technophobic state regulators.
While Stevens would have allowed the protectionist state statutes to stand,
his argument was limited to wine sales, which is also affected by the 21st
Amendment. He wrote that "The New York and Michigan laws challenged in these
cases would be patently invalid under well settled dormant Commerce Clause
principles if they regulated sales of an ordinary article of commerce rather
than wine."
Trademark: Reverse Passing Off. Justice Scalia wrote the 8-0 2003
opinion in Dastar v.
Twentieth Century Fox, 540 U.S. 806. Justice Stevens joined in this opinion. The defendant
copied a work whose copyright had expired, and failed to attribute its origin. The plaintiff
alleged that its work of authorship was copied (which can be actionable under
the Copyright Act), but instead proceeded on the legal theory of violation of
the Lanham Act's false designation of origin provision. Passing off occurs when
a producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else's. Reverse
passing off occurs when a producer misrepresents someone else's goods or
services as his own. Both can be actionable under the Lanham Act, which makes
actionable not only the misleading use of marks, but also the false designation
of origin of goods. The lower courts ruled for the producer. The Supreme Court
reversed. It held that this is not the purpose of the Lanham Act. Moreover,
allowing this sort of use of the Lanham Act would have the impermissible effect
of creating perpetual quasi patents and copyrights. See also,
story
titled "Supreme Court Reverses in Dastar v. Fox" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 672, June 3, 2003.
Computer Generated Images. Justice Stevens joined with the majority in the
Court's 2002 opinion
in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, a case
involving a constitutional challenge to part of the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996 (CPPA). The Court ruled that provisions of the statute banning
computer generated images depicting minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct
is overbroad, and violates the First Amendment. See also,
story titled "Supreme Court Upholds Speech Rights of Child Pornographers" in
TLJ Daily E-Mail
Alert No. 412, April 17, 2002. The Congress then rewrote the statute at issue.
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